Wittgenstein contradicts himself.

"Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge." (Tractatus 1.1)

So Wittgenstein insists that the world, rather than being a totality of things (der Dinge) is a totality of facts (der Tatsachen).

Very well then. So what exactly ARE facts, Mr. Wittgenstein? Ah, I see that you have defined them not a few lines later:

"Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten."  (2)

So facts and the case (der Fall) are synonyms, and both can be defined as states of affairs. And what, finally, is a state of affairs?

"Der Sachverhalt ist eine Verbindung von Gegenständen. (Sachen, Dingen.)"  (2.01)


States of affairs are combinations of Dingen; things. Ding Ding!! We have an answer!!! Facts are nothing other than states of affairs, which are nothing other than things!! Taking Mr. Wittgenstein at his own word, we may express his primordial proposition thus:

"The world is the totality of things, not of things."

Well done sir. In building a whole philosophy on the importance of expressing language meaningfully and sensibly, you have made a buffoon of yourself on the first page.